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ABSTRACT 
Freud derived his fundamental concepts, which became the basis for 
his metapsychology, primarily from his early experiences with hys-
teria. These basic concepts included the unconscious, repression, 
resistance, the Oedipus complex and psychosexual development. 
Later speculations were predicated upon these postulates. It is 
contended that these concepts were faulted Uy both his failure to 
accept Breuer's observations on self-hypnotic (hypnoid) states and 
Uy his creation of a fantasy theory of sexual molestation. 
Despite Freud's eminence and his influence upon West-
ern thought, his theories remain controversial. Over the 
course of his long and productive life he wrote many books 
and papers, but his fundamental concepts were developed 
early in his career, primarily from his experiences with 
patients suffering hysteria. These concepts became the 
foundation of and remained the key elements in his 
metapsychology. 
The origin of dynamic psychiatry has a lengthy history 
(Ellenberger, 1970; Bliss, 1986), but for the sake of brevity 
we will begin in 1889 when Pierre Janet in Paris published 
a remarkable volume on psychological automatisms (1889) 
in which he expounded the novel thesis that hysterical 
symptoms were due to noxious childhood experiences 
which had been isolated and forgotten. Furthermore, he 
observed that the dissociation of these experiences from 
the mainstream of consciousness produced a variety of 
symptoms. The cause of this dissociation or split for Janet 
was a congenital weakness of psychological synthesis that 
allowed this fragmentation of the mind to occur. 
Virtually simultaneously but independently in Vienna, 
from 1880 to 1882 Josef Breuer was treating "Anna 0.," the 
most famous case in the annals of psychoanalysis (Breuer & 
Freud, 1895/ 1957) . "Anna 0." was a severe hysteric who 
suffered a galaxy of conversion symptoms-probably an 
undetected multiple personality. Breuer was making iden-
tical observations to those of Janet, but he also identified 
another crucial feature of the hysterical state undetected by 
Janet. Breuer recognized that "Anna 0." spon taneously was 
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entering "hypnoid" or "self-hypnotic" states. 
She would enter altered states of consciousness sponta-
neously, and in these "hypnoid" states a remarkable shift 
would occur. In her normal alert state she would have no 
inkling of why a symptom was present, but when she con-
verted to self-hypnosis she would recognize why and how 
the symptom had been generated. When the forgotten 
episode was revealed and the feelings attending it were 
expressed, the symptom would disappear. 
Furthermore, Breuer asserted that the basis of hysteria 
was the existence of these hypnoid states that had the power 
to create an amnesia. In turn, the amnesia created an un-
conscious so that the individual then had three, rather than 
the normal two states of mind. The hysteric had the normal 
waking and sleeping states, but in addition had a hypnoid 
state. 
The next element in this tale was introduced in Novem-
ber, 1882, when Breuer told his young friend, Sigmund 
Freud, the details of this unusual case. It made a deep 
impression upon Freud, and the two discussed the case on 
many occasions. 
There next followed perhaps the most remarkable twist 
to this tale. Freud rejected Breuer's concept of self-hypno-
sis. In both the monograph on hysteria (Breuer & Freud, 
1895/ 1957) and in his autobiography (Freud, 1948), Freud 
summed up the issue rather cryptically. In essence, he 
contended that he had never encountered a "self-hypnotic" 
hysteria-only "defense" neuroses. Breuer had offered him 
a potent concept, that of self-hypnosis, but for reasons still 
not fully explicable Freud had disclaimed it and instead 
postulated "repression." 
But why is spontaneous self-hypnosis such a powerful 
concept? If one accepts the concept, it then explains the 
amnesias, an unconscious, and resistances. Furthermore, it 
leads to the question of the phenomena of hypnosis. By the 
end of the 19th century these were known. Bramwell sum-
marized these hypnotic capabilities in his 1903 textbook on 
hypnosis. He noted subjects in deep hypnosis were able to 
demonstrate catalepsy, paralysis and flaccidity of muscles; 
to affect all sensations-vision, audition, smell, taste, touch, 
pressure, temperature and pain-and to make them more 
acute, to diminish or arrest them; to produce anesthesia, 
analgesia or amnesia; or to induce delusions, hallucinations 
and illusions. I would summarize this by concluding that 
deep hypnosis can manipulate all functions of the neo-
cortex with a sense of realism because deep hypnosis creates 
an inner world that is perceived as real as the real world-
a domain of subjectively realistic fantasy and subjectively re-
alistic memory (Bliss, 1986). 
But the traumas concealed by the amnesia of hypnosis 
can produce phobias, irrational behaviors, depressions, de-
lusions, hallucinations, mood swings, conversion symptoms 
and much else. The creation of personalities is only one of 
its myriad capabilities (Bliss, 1986). 
It can be shown that almost any symptom and almost any 
syndrome known to psychiatry can be simulated by this 
spontaneous self-hypnotic process. If Freud had explored 
this self-hypnotic process, it might have led him in a quite 
different direction and his findings might have dictated a 
different conceptual system. 
Breuer had observed these self-hypnotic states in "Anna 
0 ." and had given the concept to Freud, but Freud had 
repudiated it. One can only speculate about the reasons for 
this oversight. Freud was admittedly uncomfortable with 
hypnosis, although he did use it for several years. Another 
factor was his legitimate concern with the defensive compo-
nent of the hysterical process; his preoccupation with this 
idea of defense may have closed his mind to other consid-
erations. This concept was valid, but unfortunately it was 
only one important element in the process. I contend that 
the more powerful concept was the self-hypnosis, which 
contrived the defense. 
The major reason for the repudiation of Breuer's obser-
vation could have been what I would consider bad luck. 
Freud may have had the ill fortune not to have patients like 
"Anna 0." early in his career. I speculate that once he came 
to his final conclusions and rejected "self-hypnosis," his 
mind then probably closed to this possibility. Whatever the 
reasons, he was deprived of the concept. By the end of the 
19th century, there was an abundance of information about 
the capabilities of hypnosis readily available, and he might 
well have unravelled their implications. 
Instead, he posited "repression," which was a euphe-
mism for "forgetting." It contained little conceptual direc-
tion, whereas self-hypnosis would have led to the well-
known amnesia of hypnosis, which is the defensive capabil-
ity of hypnosis. This, in turn, goes to the concept of a 
hypnotic concealment, ergo a hypnotic unconscious. In-
stead of recognizing a variety of unconscious processes, he 
was forced to postulate an unconscious with a confusing 
conglomerate of elements which defied scientific examina-
tion. 
In his letters to Fleiss, Freud wrote (1948) that the theory 
of repression became the foundation stone of the under-
standing of neuroses. If he had replaced "repression" with 
"self-hypnosis," such a sweeping generalization would not 
have been possible since many people are poor hypnotic 
subjects. In the same volume, he also stated that the theory 
of resistance, repression, the unconscious, sexual life, and 
infantile experiences were the principle constituents of the 
theoretical structure of psychoanalysis. 
I will now address what I perceive to be the second 
conceptual problem, which is important but less fundamen-
tal than the first (i.e ., the rejection ofthe implications of the 
"self-hypnosis" paradigm). Freud initially discovered sexual 
molestation by fathers of their daughters as the basis for 
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later neuroses (Freud, 1896a/ 1949, 1896b/ 1949, 19051 
1949) . These memories had been "repressed," but later 
were revealed in therapy. I would suggest instead that they 
had been self-hypnotically concealed. But there then came 
an embarrassing insight. Freud reversed himself and be-
came convinced that what his patients reported were not 
real experiences but were fan tasies (Freud, 1905/ 1949, 
1954). This was startling, because logically it led to the 
assumption that young children must have heterosexual 
fantasies. What was his evidence for the reversal of this 
opinion? He asked whether perverted acts against children 
could be so common, but that seemed "hardly credible." At 
the time this was certainly a powerful objection, but it could 
only have been settled by a careful inquiry directed at the 
other persons who were involved. Freud was in no position 
to pursue such investigations, and logically this assumption 
should have remained moot. There was next his legitimate 
consideration that in the unconscious there is no criterion 
of reality, so that truth cannot be distinguished from an 
emotional fiction. I would revise this somewhat, but my 
conclusion would be identical. In the state of spontaneous 
deep hypnosis, within the unconscious domain that it cre-
ates, fantasies can become perceived as facts, so that when 
the individual exits this state, not realizing where he has 
been, the experience can be perceived as very real, and can 
be believed. 
He finally cited the fact that such memories never emerge 
in the deliria of even the most severe psychoses. This may 
not be a valid observation. In hysterical psychoses elements 
of such experiences may be found, but again even in these 
disturbed states a total emergence is often defended. 
This repudiation of real infantile sexual traumas by 
Freud proved to be a second turning point in his scientific 
career. Henceforth, these repressed infantile recollections 
would be considered to be fantasies-an assumption and a 
reversal of opinion destined to move psychoanalytic theory 
in new directions. 
Such vivid fantasies in children could only mean that 
children were not sexually innocent. They must have had a 
rich early sexual life which had gone undetected. Further-
more, if girls had fantasized seduction by their fathers, it 
indicated, following this reasoning, that they wished such 
experiences. Why else should such fantasies be present? As 
a result of this speculation, he had "stumbled for the first 
time upon the Oedipus complex," and it became a funda-
mental assumption of psychoanalysis. 
The concept of infantile sexual fantasies had ineluctably 
led to the Oedipus Complex, ann also to castration fears, 
psychosexual development, and further elaborations. Un-
fortunately, my data and much contemporary information 
support Freud's original hypothesis, but rejects his later 
reversal, which logically then mandated many of his favorite 
concepts. All evidence indicates that incest and the abuse, 
of children are surprisingly common. These infantile trau-
mas, be they sexual abuse, physical abuse or psychological 
injuries, in at least many cases really occurred. A few may be 
concealed by screen memories, but the amnesias are not 
dictated by fantasies. 
Since Freud's conceptual system has profoundly influ-
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enced psychiatric thinking, a reappraisal of his basic prin-
ciples from the perspective of more recent observations 
may further clarify the controversial issues. This would be 
only of historical interest if it were not for the continuing 
importance of his concepts to contemporary psychiatric 
thinking. Many contemporary systems of therapy rely upon 
Freud's theories in obvious or subtle ways, often without 
recognition of their indebtedness. A scholarly examination 
of his many insights must be left to historians. My purpose 
is only to examine the two key elements noted above. 
From the perspective of my studies of hypnosis and 
experience with patients with multiple personality disorder 
and hysteria, Freud's system was flawed by these two concep-
tual commitments. Both came early, were fundamental to 
his formative thinking, and directed his later speculations. 
The first error was the rejection of Breuer's concept of 
self-hypnotic states. But what is the evidence for self-hyp-
notic states? 
There are many converging lines of evidence that sup-
port the importance of self-hypnosis as a major factor in the 
illness of multiple personality disorder, as well as in hysteria. 
These patients, in my experience, are excellent hypnotic 
subjects. Most are capable of posthypnotic amnesia, and 
many can do automatic writing. Some are hypnotic virtuo-
sos who can perform all the feats described by the 19th 
century hypnotists. This clinical impression has been sup-
ported by formal hypnotic testing. Twenty-eight patients 
with multiple personality have been administered the Stan-
ford Hypnotic Susceptibility Scale (Form C) (Weitzenhof-
fer & Hilgard, 1962). Scores on this test range from 0 to 12. 
The test was originally standardized on 307 Stanford U ni-
versity students. The mean score for this group and the 
standard error of the mean was 5.2+0.18. We have studied 
a group of89 heavy cigarette smokers who scored 6.6 ± 0.28. 
It is difficult to know which population should be desig-
nated as a "normal" one, but in this case it has not made any 
statistical difference since the patient population scored 
10.1 ± 0.36, a remarkably high level and one with a proba-
bility value of less than .001. These figures confirm the 
clinical impression that patients with multiple personality 
disorder have unusual hypnotic abilities. 
But everyone does not have this hypnotic ability, since it 
is a trait (roughly) normally distributed throughout the 
population (Hilgard, 1965). Presumably many individuals 
do not have sufficient hypnotic talent to create realistic alter 
personalities or major conversion symptoms. In a study by 
London and Cooper (1969), 18 percent of adults scored in 
the high range of 9 to 12 on the Stanford Hypnotizability 
Scale. In contrast, 54 percent of children attained similar 
scores on a comparable scale. Since multiplicity begins in 
childhood, these figures suggest that close to one-half of all 
children could be at risk for the formation of alter person-
alities if other predisposing factors are present. 
The fact that many of my patien ts en tered trances rapidly 
when formally hypnotized, usually in a few minutes, also 
must be noted. This could not be attributed to the rare skills 
of this hypnotist nor to any unusual technique employed. 
Initially I was a hypnotic novice, yet rapid inductions oc-
curred regularly on the first trial. Since these hypnotic per-
38 
formances could not be ascribed to my abilities, and as 
subjects had only been asked to relax and to focus-com-
monplace behaviors in everyday living-I was led to believe 
that for multiple personality disorder patients this must be 
a much practiced exercise which goes unrecognized as 
hypnosis. 
Most claimed to have never been hypnotized, but when 
they were questioned about past comparable hypnotic 
experiences many recalled them. These included visual, 
auditory, tactile, olfactory, mental and physical distortions 
as well as de realized and depersonalized experiences-all 
part of the repertoire of hypnotic phenomena, known\for 
200 years and well documented in the literature on hypno-
sis. 
Furthermore, it was possible in some cases to obtain, 
without prompting, descriptions by personalities of how the 
patient created an alter ego, employing a process identifi-
able as akin to a hypnotic induction. Some personalities 
become allies to the therapist and often are perceptive 
observers. One such personality said of the patient, "She 
creates personalities by blocking everything from her head, 
mentally relaxes, concentrates very hard, and wishes." 
Another description was, "She lies down, but can do it 
sitting up, concentrates very hard, clears her mind, blocks 
everything out and then wishes for the person, but she isn't 
aware of what she is doing." 
But the most persuasive evidence for spontaneous self-
hypnosis comes from observing these patients in therapy. 
Many will drop into trances when painful events are ap-
proached. One patient had been brutally assaulted with a 
snake. During the process of desensitizing her to snakes she 
initially would disappear into hypnosis when asked to look 
at a picture of a snake. In her case, there was an obvious 
marker to identify hypnosis since her eyeballs would roll 
upward just before she "disappeared" (Bliss, 1984). 
Not only do patients with multiple personality disorder 
repeatedly and rapidly transform into these dissociated 
states, but also many in the process of therapy have for short 
periods become aphonic, blind, paralyzed, depersonalized, 
anesthetic, and amnestic. Most report many past hypnotic 
experiences of an identical nature dating back to child-
hood. In fact, they frequently recognize that an inordinate 
amount of their lives has been spent in this altered state of 
conscIOusness. 
Finally, there are forgotten traumatic experiences, resur-
rected in the course of therapy. Many were identified by 
patients, in retrospect, as self-hypnotic concealments. 
The crux of the syndrome of multiple personality disor-
der as well as grand hysteria (Bliss, 1984) seems to be these 
patients' unrecognized abuse of self-hypnosis. This unin-
ten tional misuse seems to be the primary mechanism of the 
disorder. The process begins very early in childhood, there-
after self-hypnosis becomes the dominant mode of coping. 
Unpleasant experiences are henceforth forgotten or dele-
gated to a personality by the hypnotic switch. It seems likely 
that they are excellent hypnotic subjects by virtue of years of 
unrecognized practice as well as by genetic endowment 
(Morgan, Hilgard, & Davers, 1970; Morgan, 1973). 
Next, what is the evidence that the sexual fantasy theory 
was incorrect. It has not been possible to establish the 
veracity of these forgotten and then recalled experiences in 
all patients, but in many of my subjects collateral evidence 
was available from parents, siblings and other sources. In 
one case, a father was questioned and he verified early 
incest. In two other cases, the patient had been told by 
sisters that they also had been raped by the father. In 
another case, the patient consciously remembered frag-
ments of the trauma at age seven, her pain, bruises, bleed-
ing and vaginal infection. Unrecalled but resurrected in 
therapy, was the actual rape by a vagrant. A mother con-
firmed her daughter'S molestation in another case. 
In Freud's defense, it must be recognized that the fre-
quency of incest was not recognized in his day, and it would 
have been a bold if not an unthinkable assumption to insist 
that so many middle-class fathers had sexually mistreated 
their daughters. It has been only in the last decade that 
articles and books have begun to appear verifYing the 
magnitude of child abuse and sexual assaults upon chil-
dren. 
But all multiple personality disorder patients have not 
been sexually abused, raped and physically assaulted. One 
patient was never physically abused, but the psychological 
abuse by her mother proved to be devastating. 
There are some who were not mistreated, and these seem 
to be overly "sensitive" or highly "imaginative" individuals, 
genetically endowed with excellent hypnotic capabilities. 
One was a delicate female who early felt rejected because 
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In science, incorrect hypotheses may sometimes lead to 
interesting findings. Freud's postulation of a "fantasy" the-
ory led to an examination of children's behavior and think-
ing. Many young children have a knowledge of sexuality. 
They do masturbate and play sexual games. Some concoct 
weird fantasies, and there are those who have Oedipal 
wishes. Early sexual experiences and masturbation may lay 
the groundwork for guilt; while early indoctrination and 
misadventures may direct later sexual dysfunctions. But it 
seems unlikely, in my opinion, that heterosexual fantasies 
playa major role in the formation of neuroses. 
Any further critique of Freud's analytic theories would 
go well beyond the scope of this paper. A lengthier analysis 
in greater detail has been published (Bliss, 1986). I am con-
vinced, however, that his dismissal of Breuer's concept of 
self-hypnosis and his postulation of a fantasy theory were 
major errors. Since these occurred early in his career, they 
would inevitably influence and direct, as well as distort, his 
later metapsychological concepts. My criticism of Freud 
should not distract from his stature, nor should it be under-
stood as an effort to diminish his contributions. Freud 
created a revolution in psychiatry that persists to this day; he 
convinced the world than an unconscious exists; and he 
enunciated the concept of a dynamic mind, reflecting the 
complex interplay of crucial structures and forces. • 
Bliss, E.L. (1984). Spontaneous self-hypnosis in multiple personality disorder. Psychiatric Clinics of North America, 7:135-148. 
Bliss, E.L. (1984). Hysteria and hypnosis. Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease, 172:203-206. 
Bliss, E.L. (1986). Multiple personality, allied disorders and hypnosis. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Bramwell, J.M. (1903) . Hypnosis. Its history, practice and theory. London: Grant Richards. 
Breuer, J., & Freud, S. (1957). Studies on hysteria. New York: Basic Books. (First edition, 1895). 
Ellenberger, H.F. (1970). The discovery of the unconscious. New York: Basic Books. 
Freud, S. (1896a). Further remarks on the defence neuro-psychoses. In S. Freud, (1949), Collected papers. (Vol. 1, p. 155-182). 
Longon: Hogarth Press. 
Freud, S. (1896b). The aetiology of hysteria. In Freud, S. (1949), Collected papers. (Vol. 1, p~. 183-219). London: Hogarth Press. 
Freud, S. (1905). My views on the part played by sexuality in the aetiology of the neuroses. In Freud, S. (1949), Collected papers. 
(Vol. 1, pp. 272-283). London: Hogarth Press. 
Freud, S. (1948). An autobiographical study. London: Hogarth Press. 
Freud, S. (1954). The origins of psychoanalysis. Letters to Wilhelm Fliess. New York: Basic Books. 
Hilgard, E.R. (1965). Hypnotic susceptibility. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World. 
Janet, P. (1889) . L'automatisme psychologique. Paris : Alcan. 
London, P. & Cooper, L.M. (1969). Norms of hypnotic susceptibility in children. Developmental Psychology, 1 :113-124. 
DISSOCIATION, Vol. I, No.3: September 1988 
39 
REEXAMINATION OF FREUD'S CONCEPTS 
Morgan, A.H., Hilgard, E.R., & Davers, E.C. (1970) . The heritability of hypnotic susceptibility of twins: A preliminary report. Behavior 
Genetics, 1 :213-224. 
Morgan, A.H. (1973). The heritability of hypnotic susceptibility in twins. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 82:55-61. 
Weitzenhoffer, A.M., & Hilgard, E.R. (1962). Stanford hypnotic susceptibility scale, Form C. Palo Alto: Consulting Psychologists 
Press. 
40 
DISSOCIATION, Vol. I, No.3: September 1988 
